Deep neural networks (DNNs)-powered Electrocardiogram (ECG) diagnosis systems are recently emerging, and are expected to take over tedious examinations by cardiologists. However, their vulnerability to adversarial attacks still lack comprehensive investigation. ECG recordings differ from images in the visualization, dynamic properties and accessibility. Thus, the existing image-targeted attack may not be directly applicable. To fill this gap, this paper proposes ECGadv to explore the feasibility of adversarial attacks on the arrhythmia classification system. We identify the main issues under two different deployment models (i.e., cloudbased and local-based) and propose effective attack schemes respectively. Our results demonstrate the blind spots of DNN-powered diagnosis systems under adversarial attacks, which facilitates future research on countermeasures.
Introduction
Statistics [World Health Organization, 2018] show that cardiovascular diseases are the leading health problem and cause of death worldwide. In common clinical practice, the ECG is an important tool to diagnose a wide spectrum of cardiac disorders. Traditionally, cardiologists review ECG recordings to identify abnormalities, which rely heavily on manual labor and medical expertise.
The Deep Neural Networks (DNNs)-powered approaches [Kiranyaz et al., 2016; Al Rahhal et al., 2016; Awni Y et al., 2019; IEEE-Spectrum, 2018] have been the main workhorse of recent advances in automatic ECG classification and diagnosis. With strong capabilities of autonomously learning features from raw data, DNNs-powered approaches have drawn a remarkable amount of public attention and enabled the low-cost, accurate and early cardiac diagnosis to be widely available. Advanced DNNs-based ECG classification models can either work in smart devices( e.g., Apple Watch) to provide real-time ECG monitoring(i.e., local deployment model), or be located on the cloud to facilitate tele-medicine for chronic sufferers at home or in rural communities (i.e., cloud deployment model).
Despite their great potential, DNNs' broad adoption has also aroused public concern about the reliability of the algorithm on which people's health and lives rely upon. Thus, there is an urgent need to investigate any possible breaches and vulnerabilities of DNN-based diagnosis systems.
Previous discussion on DNN model attacks mainly focus on the image domain. In the image domain, the state-ofthe-art literature has shown that an adversary can construct adversarial images by adding almost imperceptible perturbations to the input image. This misleads DNNs to misclassify them into an incorrect class [Szegedy et al., 2013; Goodfellow et al., 2014; .
Although extensive efforts have been devoted to the image domain, the adversarial attack in the medical measurement domain has been overlooked. ECG recordings departs from traditional images along three axes. In terms of visualization, ECGs are in an time-amplitude format while images are in 2D color format. Each value in an ECG represents the voltage of a sample point which is visualized as a line curve for examination. Meanwhile, each value in a image represents the grayscale or RGB value of a pixel which is visualized as the corresponding color for demonstration. In terms of dynamic properties, medical data present more periodicity while images present more locality. In terms of accessibility, images are more accessible due to the boom of the Internet and social media, while ECGs are regarded as private data and have high acquisition costs for an adversary.
These differences motivate us to reconsider adversarial attacks in the context of DNN-based ECG classification system. For cloud-based systems, the ECG recording may often be queried by cardiologists or patients themselves. Thus, we wonder whether it is possible for an adversary to corrupt an ECG example with sufficiently subtle perturbations and without arousing suspicion. Most image-targeted attacks utilized L p norm to encourage visual imperceptibility of perturbations. They may not be directly applicable on an ECG because humans have different perceptual sensitivities to colors and line curves. As shown in Fig. 1 , when two data arrays are visualized as line curves, their differences are more prominent rather than those visualized as gray-scale images. Thus, this paper explores proper metrics to quantify perceptual similarities of line curves, and leverages them to generate unsuspicious adversarial instances for cloud-based ECG system attacks. For the local-based systems, an adversary can corrupt an ECG via an EMI signal injection [Kune et al., 2013] . However, it is hard to obtain the current sampling point of the on-the-fly ECG recordings. The mismatch may make the perturbation added to the signal at a random time stamp. In addition, it is almost impossible to obtain every ECG recording especially when they are stored locally. Thus, this paper explicitly considers a possible mismatch in an attack scheme to generate perturbations that are effective for the on-the-fly signals, and the perturbations obtained based on some instances can be applicable on other unseen ones as well. In summary, the contributions of this paper are as follows:
• This paper takes the first step to investigate adversarial attacks in DNN-based ECG classification systems. We identify the main issues under two different deployment models (i.e., cloud-based and local-based) and propose effective attack schemes respectively.
• For attacks against the cloud deployment model, this paper propose a smoothness metric to quantify human perceptual distance on line cures, which captures the pattern similarity in a computationally-efficient way (Section 4.1). Adversarial attacks using the smoothness metric achieve a 99.9% success attack rate. In addition, we conduct an extensive human perceptual study on both ordinary people and cardiologists to evaluate the imperceptibility of adversarial ECG instances (Section 5.1).
• For attacks against the local deployment model, we model the sampling point uncertainty of the on-the-fly signals within the adversarial generation scheme (Section 4.2). The generated perturbations are shift-resistant to tamper with on-the-fly signals (99.55% success rate), and generalize well in unseen examples (Section 5.2).
Background
In this section, we first introduce the targeted DNN-based ECG classification system for attack scheme evaluation, then we illustrate its threat models.
Targeted DNN model
We apply our attack strategies to the DNN-based arrhythmia classification system [Rajpurkar et al., 2017; Andreotti et al., 2017; Awni Y et al., 2019 ]. An arrhythmia is defined as any rhythm other than a normal rhythm. Early and accurate detection of arrhythmia types is important for detecting heart diseases and choosing appropriate treatment for a patient. If the detection algorithm is mislead to classify an arrhythmia as a normal rhythm, the patient may miss the optimal treatment period. Conversely if a normal rhythm is misclassified as an arrhythmia, the patient may accept unnecessary consultation and treatment, which would result in a waste of medical resources. Thus, this paper aims to explore the blind spots of such a system and call attention to adequate countermeasures against adversarial attacks. The original model [Rajpurkar et al., 2017] adopts 34-layer Residual Networks (ResNet) [He et al., 2016] to classify a 30s single-lead ECG segment into 14 different classes. However, their dataset and trained model are not public.
In the Physionet/Computing in the Cardiology Challenge 2017 [Clifford et al., 2017] , [Andreotti et al., 2017] reproduced the ResNet approach by [Rajpurkar et al., 2017] Figure 2 . PhyDB dataset consists of 8,528 short single-lead ECG segments labeled as 4 classes: normal rhythm(N), atrial fibrillation(A), other rhythm(O) and noise(∽). Both atrial fibrillation and other rhythm indicates arrhythmia. Atrial fibrillation is the most prevalent cardiac arrhythmia and can occur in sustained or intermittent episodes. "Other rhythm" in the dataset refers to other abnormal arrhythmia except atrial fibrillation. 
Threat Models
As introduced above, DNN-based arrhythmia classification systems can be deployed on the cloud or local devices.
In the cloud deployment model, echocardiograms (ECGs) are measured using portable ECG patches like Life Signal LP1100 2 or household medical instruments like Heal Force ECG monitor 3 . Th ECGs are uploaded to the cloud through a paired smartphone/PC. The ECG classification system on the cloud conducts analysis and handles data queries from both patients and cardiologists. The attacker may conduct middleman attacks to corrupt the data before being uploaded to the cloud. The corrupted data misleads the ECG classification system to give an incorrect diagnosis, and in the meanwhile, the data perturbations should be sufficiently subtle that they are either imperceptible to humans, or if perceptible, seems natural and not representative of an attack.
In the local deployment model, ECGs are measured and analyzed in a local device. A DNN-based ECG classification model is compressed and stored in the local device. The attacker may inject the perturbations to the on-the-fly ECG signals in real time via EMI signal injection [Kune et al., 2013] to mislead the classifier. The attacker tries to maximize the success probability of attacks to disturb the normal operation of ECG monitoring devices.
Adversarial Examples
In the state-of-the-art literature, considerable attack strategies have been proposed to generate adversarial examples.
Attacks can be classified into targeted and untargeted attacks based on the adversarial goal. In a targeted attack, the adversary modifies an input to mislead the targeted model to classify the perturbed input into a chosen class, while the adversary of an untargeted attack aims to make the perturbed input misclassified to any class other than the ground truth. In this paper, we only focus on the more powerful targeted attacks. According to the accessibility to the target model, the existing attacks fall into two categories, white-box and black-box attacks. In a white-box manner, an adversary has complete access to a classifier [Szegedy et al., 2013; Goodfellow et al., 2014; Kurakin et al., 2018] , while in black-box manner, an adversary has zero knowledge about them [Papernot et al., 2016; Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2017; .
In this paper, we study the adversarial attacks in the white-box setting. On one side, we would like to explore the upper bound of an adversary to better motivate defense methods. On the other side, prior works [Papernot et al., 2016; have shown the transferability of adversarial attacks, i.e, it is possible to train a substitute model given black-box access to a target model, and transfer the attacks to it by attacking the substitute one.
In the image domain, most existing works adopted L p norm as approximations of human perceptual distance to constrain the distortion. However, for medical data in time-series format, people focus more on the overall pattern/shape, which requires other distance metrics to quantify (see Section 4.1 for more details).
Recent works [Kurakin et al., 2018; Athalye et al., 2018b; Chen et al., 2018] have explored the robustness of the adversarial examples in the physical world, where the input images could not be precisely controlled, and may change under different viewpoints, lighting and camera noise. Our attack strategy on the local deployment model is inspired by [Athalye et al., 2018b; Brown et al., 2017] . Different from images, we deal with sampling point uncertainty of the on-the-fly signals. For the emerging defense methods, [Athalye et al., 2018a] proposed a general framework to circumvent several published defenses based on randomly transforming the input. Thus, we do not discuss defense breaking in this paper.
Arrhythmia Classification System
Considerable efforts have been made on automated arrhythmia classification systems to take over tedious examinations by cardiologists. The major challenges are the lack of feature standardization, intra-features variability and interpatients variability [Jambukia et al., 2015] . Deep learning methods show great potential due to their ability to automatically learn features through multiple levels of abstraction, which frees the system from the dependence on handengineered features. Recent works [Kiranyaz et al., 2016; Al Rahhal et al., 2016; Awni Y et al., 2019] started applying DNN models on ECG signals for arrhythmia classification and achieved good performance. For any system in the health-care field, it is crucial to defend against any possible attacks since people's lives rely heavily on the system's reliability. Prior work [Kune et al., 2013] has launched attacks to pollute the measurement of cardiac devices by a low-power emission of chosen electromagnetic waveforms. The adversarial attacks studied in this paper and the injection attacks in [Kune et al., 2013] complement each other. The injection attack can inject the carefully-crafted perturbation generated by adversarial attacks to perform targeted attacks to mislead the arrhythmia classification system on cardiac devices.
Technical Approach
In this section, we illustrate our attack strategies for the cloud and local deployment models respectively.
Attack Strategy for Cloud Deployment Model
Problem Formulation Given an m-class classifier, g : X → Y that accepts an input x ∈ X and produces an output y ∈ Y. The output vector y, treated as the probability distribution, satisfies 0 ≤ y i ≤ 1 and m i=1 y i = 1. The classifier assigns the label C (x) = argmax i g(x) i to the input x. Let C * (x) be the correct label of x. Given a valid input x and a target class t = C * (x), an adversary aims to generate adversarial examples x adv so that the classifier predicts g(x adv ) = t (i.e. successful attack), and x adv and x are close based on the similarity metric (i.e. visual imperceptibility). It can be modeled as a constrained minimization problem as seen in prior works [Szegedy et al., 2013] :
where D is some similarity metric. It is worth mentioning that there is no box constraints for time-series measurement.
It is equivalent to solve :
where f g is an objective function mapping the input to a positive number, which satisfies f g (x adv ) ≤ 0 if and only if C (x adv ) = t. One common objective function is crossentropy. We adopt the one in .
where Z(x) = z is logits, i.e., the output of all layers except the softmax. (e) + is short-hand for max(e, 0).
Similarity Metrics
To generate adversarial examples, we require a distance metric to quantify perceptual similarity to encourage visual imperceptibility. The widely-adopted distance metrics in the literature are L p norms x adv − x p , where the p-norm · p is defined as
L p norms focus on the change in each pixel value. However, human perception on line curves focuses mainly on the overall pattern/shape.
Studies in [Eichmann and Zgraggen, 2015; Gogolou et al., 2018] show that given a group of line curves for similarity assessment, pattern-focused distance metrics like the Dynamic time warping (DTW)-based one produce rankings that are closer to the human-annotated rankings than other metrics like Euclidean distance. DTW is widely-adopted to quantify the similarity of the time series. However, the nondifferentiability and non-parallelism make it ill-suited for adversarial attacks. Recent work [Cuturi and Blondel, 2017] proposes a differentiable DTW variant, Soft-DTW. However, Soft-DTW does not change the essence of DTW -a standard dynamic programming problem. The value and gradient of Soft-DTW would be computed in quadratic time, and it is hard to leverage the parallel computing of the GPU to speed it up.
To capture the pattern similarity in a computation-efficient way, we adopt the following metric, denoted as smoothness as our similarity metric. Given δ = x adv − x and var(·) refers to variance calculation:
Smoothness metric d smooth quantifies the smoothness of perturbation(δ) by measuring the variation of the difference between neighbouring points of perturbation. The smaller the variation, the smoother the perturbation. A smoother perturbation δ means that the adversarial instances x ′ are more likely to preserve a similar pattern to the original instance x. In the extreme case where d smooth = 0, δ should be a constant and x adv = x + constant, i.e., the adversarial instances x adv have the same pattern as the original instance x. It is worth mentioning that in our attack scheme, we intentionally preserve the zero-mean and one-variance property of the generated x adv , therefore the perturbation can nor easily be filtered by the normalization layer of the system. Besides, the smoothness metric can be computed with linear time and accelerated by parallel computing as L 2 norm, which is favorable in adversarial attacks.
Attack Strategy for Local Deployment Model
Problem Formulation Given the same m-class classifier, g : X → Y as in the cloud deployment model, there exists uncertainty of current sample points of the on-the-fly signal in the local deployment model. Inspired by Expectation Over Transformation(EOT) [Athalye et al., 2018b] , we regard such uncertainty as a shifting transformation of the original measurement and explicitly consider such a transformation within the optimization procedure. Given a distance function D(·, ·) and a chosen distribution T of transformation function t, we aim to constrain the expected effective distance between the adversarial and original inputs:
Thus, the adversarial attacks can be modeled as follows: argmax
Here we add a constraint D(t(x adv ), t(x)) < ǫ, which forces the adversarial examples to be within a certain distance constraint of the original. However, ǫ is large enough that x adv can have a large probability of successful attacks under most shifting transformations. Moreover, since the ECG signals of the same class from different people are quite similar to each other, a sufficiently large ǫ can implicitly enable the universality of an adversarial sample, i.e., a perturbation can have an effect on other unseen samples of the same class.
Perturbation Window Size
Since we attack on-the-fly signals on local devices, it is better that the perturbation attracts minimal attention of the victim. Thus, we introduce a new parameter, the length of the perturbation w d , which could be set by the adversary and fixed during the perturbation generation. w d gives the system flexibility to control the added perturbation. The intuition behind is that the smaller w d is, the less chance that the victim will perceive the attack. Moreover, the larger w d is, the generated perturbation has higher probability of having an effect on other unseen samples of the same class(i.e., universality).
Experimental Results
In this section, we evaluate our attacks for the cloud deployment and local deployment models respectively 4 .
Evaluation for cloud deployment model Experiment Setup
We implement our attack strategy for the cloud deployment model under the framework of CleverHans [Papernot et al., 2018] . We adopt the Adam optimizer [Kingma and Ba, 2014] with 0.005 learning rate to search for adversarial examples. We compare the performance of three similarity metrics on adversarial examples generation, given δ = x adv − x
All metrics are evaluated under the same optimization scheme with the same hyper-parameters. Notice that the target model is not accurate on all ECG segments in the PhyDB dataset. Therefore, we only generate adversarial examples for those segments correctly classified by the model. The profile of the attack dataset is shown in Table 1 . Here, "A, N, O, ∽" denote normal rhythm, atrial fibrillation(AF), other rhythm and noisy signal respectively in the following evaluation. The sampling rate of the ECG segment is 300Hz, i.e., the length of a 30s ECG segment is 9000. The input vector of the target model in Figure 2 is 9000. 
Success Rate of Targeted Attacks
We select the first 360 segments of class N, class A and class O respectively, and the first 220 segments of class ∽ in attack dataset to evaluate the success rate of the targeted attacks.
For each ECG segment, we conduct three targeted attacks to other classes one by one. Thus, we have 12 source-target pairs given 4 classes. The attack results are shown in Table 2 . With all three similarity metrics, the generated adversarial instances achieve quite high attack success rates. d l2 fails in a few instances of some source-target pairs, such as "O → A", "A → N", "O → N" and "∽ → N". d smooth case achieves almost a 100% success rate and d smooth,l2 achieves a 100% success rate. A sample of generated adversarial ECG signals are shown in Fig. 3 . Due to the limited space, we only show a case where an original atrial fibrillation ECG(A) is misclassified to a normal rhythm(N). It is noticed that the one generated with d l2 metric looks more suspicious due to lots of small spikes, while the d smooth one preserves more similar pattern to the original. The property of d smooth,l2 falls in between the above two as expected.
Human Perceptual Study
We conduct an extensive human perceptual study on both ordinary people and cardiologists to evaluate the imperceptibility of adversarial ECG instances. Ordinary human participants are recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk(AMT), who do not have relevant medical expertise. Thus, they are only required to compare the adversarial examples generated using different similarity metrics and choose the one closer to the original ECG. For each similarity metric, we generate 600 adversarial examples from the PhyDB dataset (each source-target pair accounts for 50 examples). In the study, the participants are asked to observe an original example and its two adversarial ones generated using two different similarity metrics. Then they need to choose one of the two adversarial examples that is closer to the original. Table 3 , where "triumphs" denotes the metric got 4 or 5 votes for all 5 annotations, and "wins" denotes that the metric got 3 votes for 5, i.e., a narrow victory. Compared with the d l2 -generated examples, the d smoothgenerated ones are voted closer to the original in 81.34% of the trials. When comparing d l2 and d smooth,l2 , the latter is voted as the winner in 84% of the trials. This indicates that the smoothness metric encourages generated adversarial examples preserve similar patterns to original ones, so they are more likely to be imperceptible. When comparing d smooth and d smooth,l2 , d smooth get a few more votes (59.67%) than d smooth,l2 , which further validates that the smoothness metric better qualifies human similarity perception on line curves than L 2 norm.
Besides participants on AMT, we also invite three cardiologists to evaluate whether added perturbations arouse their suspicion and influence their medical judgement. The cardiologists are asked to classify the given ECG and its adversarial counterparts into 4 classes(A, N, O, ∽) based on their medical expertise. As illustrated in Section 2.1, it is important to distinguish between normal and abnormal rhythms. Thus, we focus on the cases of "N → A", "N → O", "A → N", "O → N", which misclassify a normal rhythm to an arrhythmia or vise versa. For the above 4 source-target pairs, we randomly select 6 type N, 3 type A and 3 type O, then we conduct corresponding targeted attacks with different similarity metrics to generate adversarial examples. Thus, we have 48 samples (original and adversarial ones) and shuffle them randomly. For every sample, we collect annotations from all three cardiologists. The results are shown in Table 4 . Each row refers to one cardiologist. The first column denotes the percentage of the cardiologist's annotations which are the same as the labels in the original PhyDB dataset. Only one cardiologist annotates a type A instance as type O. The last three columns show the percentage of adversarial examples which are annotated the same type as their original counterparts. High percentage means that added perturbations do not arouse their suspicion and influence their medical judgment. The results show that in all cases, cardiologists give the same annotations to adversarial examples as their original counterparts. The possible reason is that most perturbations generally occur on the wave valley, but the cardiologists give annotations based on the peak-to-peak intervals. They think the subtle perturbations possibly caused by instrument noise.
Evaluation for local deployment model Success Rate of Targeted Attacks
We implement our attack strategy for the local deployment model under the framework of CleverHans [Papernot et al., 2018] . We maximize the objective function using the Adam [Kingma and Ba, 2014] optimizer, and approximate the gradient of the expected value through independently sampling transformations at each gradient decent step. Among 12 source-target pairs, we randomly choose 10 samples of each pair to generate adversarial perturbations by applying the attack strategy in Section 4.2. It is worth mentioning that we generate one perturbation from one sample. Thus, we have 10 perturbations from 10 samples. Then we apply the above perturbations to 100 randomly-chosen samples of the corresponding source class to see whether the adversarial examples could mislead the classifier universally. To mimic the sample point uncertainty of the on-the-fly signals, we generate the perturbation at full length which means w d is equal to 9000. Then we randomly shift perturbations and add them to the original signals. In this evaluation, we randomly shift the perturbations 200 times for testing. The average success rates are shown in Table 5 . Our attack strategy achieves pretty high success rates, which indicates that the generated perturbation is both shift-resistant and universal. 
Impact of Window Size
In this section, we evaluate the accuracy with different sized windows w d . As mentioned before, the smaller the window size, the lower the chance that the attacker can be perceived. In this evaluation, we generate perturbations on different sized windows 9000,6000,4500, 3000 and 1500. For each window size, we generate adversarial examples under the same conditions as the previous section -randomly 10 samples for 12 sourcetarget pairs. Then we shift the perturbation randomly and add it to other samples from the original source class. The results are shown in Figure 4 . We can see that in most cases the success rate decreases a lot when the window size increases. However, they slowly decrease and even remain almost unchanged under the cases of "A → O", "N → O" and "∽ → O". All these cases are from a certain class to class O. This is mainly because class O (refers to other abnormal arrhythmia except atrial fibrillation) may cover an expansive input space so that it is easier to misclassify an other class to class O. Besides, we find that except for class O, the success rate decrease more slowly when the target class is A. The possible reason is the inherent property of class A, i.e., if a certain part of the ECG signal is regraded as atrial fibrillation, then the whole ECG segment will be classified as class A.
Conclusion
This paper proposes ECGadv to generate adversarial ECG examples to misguide both cloud-based and local-based arrhythmia classification systems. We identify the main issues under two different deployment models and propose effective attack schemes respectively. For attacks against the cloud model, this paper proposes a smoothness metric to encourage visual imperceptibility. Extensive human perceptual studies on both ordinary people and cardiologists validate the visual imperceptibility of the perturbations. For attacks against the local model, we model the sampling point uncertainty of the on-the-fly signals within the adversarial generation scheme.
